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THE GLASS HOUSE EFFECT: BIG DATA, THE NEW
OIL, AND THE POWER OF ANALOGY
Dennis D. Hirsch*
I. INTRODUCTION
One hears with some frequency today that “data is the new oil.”1 Recently,
Virginia Rometty, IBM’s Chief Executive Officer, updated the phrase, explaining
that Big Data is the new oil.2 Most people who use the analogy do so in order to
convey Big Data’s tremendous value. Data is an essential resource that powers the
information economy much like oil has fueled the industrial economy. Big Data3
promises a plethora of new uses—the identification and prevention of pandemics, 4
the emergence of new businesses and business sectors,5 the improvement of health
care quality and efficiency,6 and enhanced protection of the environment,7 to name
but a few—just as oil has generated useful plastics, petro-chemicals, lubricants, and
* Geraldine W. Howell Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. The Author would like
to thank Professor Paul Ohm for suggesting the idea for this paper, and for early discussions that helped
to shape it. Unless otherwise indicated, the author alone is responsible for the paper’s content. Portions
of this Article were included in a paper presented at the Future of Privacy Forum and the Stanford
Center for Internet & Society’s workshop, Big Data and Privacy: Making Ends Meet, available at
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/big-data-privacy-workshop-paper-collection.
1. See, e.g., Clive Humby, Address at the ANA Senior Marketer’s Summit at the Kellogg School
(2006); Michael Palmer, Data is the New Oil, ANA MKTG. MAESTROS (Nov. 3, 2006, 5:43 AM),
http://ana.blogs.com/maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html; Personal Data: The “New Oil” of the 21st
Century, Panel Discussion of the World Economic Forum on Europe & Central Asia (June 9, 2011),
available at http://www.weforum.org/sessions/summary/personal-data-new-oil-21st-century.
2. Maria Deutscher, IBM’s CEO Says Big Data is Like Oil, Enterprises Need Help Extracting the
Value, SILICON ANGLE (Mar. 11, 2013), http://siliconangle.com/blog/2013/03/11/ibms-ceo-says-bigdata-is-like-oil-enterprises-need-help-extracting-the-value. See also VICTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER &
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK AND
THINK 16 (2013); Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n., Sloan Cyber Security Lecture: A Call to
Arms: The Role of Technologists in Protecting Privacy in the Age of Big Data 1 (Oct. 23, 2013),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/call-arms-roletechnologists-protecting-privacy -age-big-data/131023nyupolysloanlecture.pdf (stating that Big Data is
the “new oil”) [hereinafter Brill Lecture]; Sam Pfeifle, Big Data=Big Oil?, IAPP: THE PRIVACY
ADVISOR (Apr. 1, 2013), https://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/2013_03_20_big_data_big_
oil.
3. “The term ‘Big Data’ refers to datasets whose size is beyond the ability of typical database
software tools to capture, store, manage and analyze.” ANN CAVOUKIAN & JEFF JONAS, INFO. &
PRIVACY COMM’R (ONTARIO, CAN.), PRIVACY BY DESIGN IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 3 (June 8, 2012),
available at http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2012/06/pbd-big_data.pdf.
4. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 2-3.
5. Id. at 3.
6. JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR
INNOVATION,
COMPETITION
AND
PRODUCTIVITY
2
(May
2011),
available
at
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGI/Research/Techno
logy%20and%20Innovation/Big%20Data/MGI_big_data_exec_summary.ashx.
7. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 248 (2013).
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gasoline. Big Data “is becoming a significant corporate asset, a vital economic
input, and the foundation of new business models. It is the oil of the information
economy.”8
This Article looks at the analogy in a different way, one not yet developed in
the scholarly literature. It examines the underside of the ‘Big Data is the new oil’
comparison. Oil certainly has many productive uses, but it also leads to oil
pollution. Big Data is similar. It produces tremendous benefits, but simultaneously
generates significant privacy injuries.9 As the data sets get larger, the threat grows
as well.10 Big Data is like a massive oil tanker navigating the shoals of hackers,
criminals and human error. It can make us smarter and wealthier and our lives
better. However, like oil, it can also harm us. Environmental law has developed
ways to reduce oil pollution. This Article draws on this environmental law success
story to identify ways that law and policy can protect privacy in the era of Big
Data.
The Article begins by developing the analogy between oil pollution and
privacy injuries. Oil pollutes in two principal ways. It spills, and so despoils
beaches, coastlines and waters. It also produces carbon emissions and so
contributes to the greenhouse effect and climate change. Big Data creates
analogous privacy injuries. Like oil, it spills. Data security breaches—such as the
2013 Target Thanksgiving and Christmas shopping season breach, in which
hackers gained access to an estimated 70-110 million customer names, credit and
debit card numbers, expiration dates and security codes11—cause broad harm,
much as oil spills create wide-spread damage. Big Data’s privacy impacts are also
analogous to carbon emissions and climate change. Oil combustion contributes to a
growing layer of greenhouse gases that traps the sun’s heat, causes climate change,
and so makes the physical environment less hospitable for humans and other forms
of life.12 In a similar way, the producers of Big Data are generating layer upon
layer of personal information. This build-up increases the hot glare of public
scrutiny and so makes the social environment less conducive to the growth of the
human personality which requires a degree of shade and shelter in which to
8. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 16.
9. STANLEY R.M. OLIVEIRA & OSMAR R. ZAÏANE, TOWARDS STANDARDIZATION IN PRIVACYPRESERVING DATA MINING § 3.1 (2004), available at http://www.agencia.cnptia.embrapa.br/
Repositorio/dm-ssp04ID-9ZWpbbVpUP.pdf (explaining that, while “data mining can be extremely
valuable in many applications (e.g., business, medical analysis, etc[.]), it can also, in the absence of
adequate safeguards, violate informational privacy”).
10. This is true, first, because more personal data is released. It is further true because it is easier to
re-identify large de-identified data sets, than to re-identify small ones.
11. See
Chronology
of
Data
Breaches,
PRIVACY
RTS.
CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.privacyrights.org/sites/privacyrights.org/files/static/Chronology-of-Data-Breaches__Privacy-Rights-Clearinghouse.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (explaining that Target “customers who
used a payment card at any of Target's stores nationwide between November 27, 2013 and December
15, 2013 may have had their payment card information copied for fraudulent purposes. Customer
names, credit or debit card numbers, card expiration dates, and card security codes were taken and have
appeared on the black market.”)
12. CHRIS WOLD, DAVID HUNTER, & MELISSA POWERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 5 (2009)
(explaining that the burning of fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide which is “by far the most important”
man-made greenhouse gas).
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flourish. This is not the greenhouse effect, but the glass house effect, since it gives
each of us the sense that we are living in a glass house. Climate change is a good
analogy for a transformation so profound that it is at once happening all around us
and, at the same time, difficult to grasp and identify.
In their Harvard Business Review Article, How Strategists Really Think:
Tapping the Power of Analogy, Professors Gavetti and Rivkin explain that
analogies can not only help us understand contemporary problems; they can also
enable us to develop solutions to them.13 Strategic thinkers begin by comparing a
new problem to a prior one for which they have a remedy.14 Then they take the
solution to the prior problem, adapt it to the new context, and so develop ideas
about how to address the current issue.15 The “Big Data is the new oil” analogy is
powerful in this way. Society has developed legal and policy solutions to oil
pollution. We should be able to take these measures—the solutions to the familiar
problem—translate them into the privacy realm, and so gain insight into how to
reduce Big Data’s impacts on privacy.
That is what the second portion of this Article attempts to do. It explains how
the Clean Water Act16 and the Oil Pollution Act17 succeeded in reducing oil tanker
spills. It takes these strategies, adapts them for the privacy realm, and so produces
a set of legal and policy recommendations for decreasing data spills. It then turns
to climate change policy—particularly laws and policies designed to promote clean
energy innovation—and translate it into a federal government strategy for
promoting technologies that can allow us to achieve the many benefits of Big Data,
while reducing its harmful effects on privacy. This will mitigate the glass house
effect.
This project is important, not only for the protection of privacy, but for the
future of Big Data and data analytics itself. Consider the following example: New
York, Oakland, and other cities have been collecting massive amounts of
surveillance camera data and mining it for law enforcement purposes.18 This
promises to reduce crime and increase personal safety.19 It also constitutes a major
business opportunity for IBM and Microsoft, the providers of this Big Data
13. See Giovanni Gavetti & Jan W. Rivkin How Strategists Really Think: Tapping the Power of
Analogy, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 1, 2005, at 1.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id. As Gavetti and Rivkin explain it, strategic, analogical reasoning involves
a novel problem that has to be solved or a new opportunity that begs to be tapped; a
specific prior setting that managers deem to be similar in its essentials; and a solution that
managers can transfer from its original setting to the unfamiliar context. When managers
face a problem, sense “Ah, I’ve seen this one before,” and reach back to an earlier
experience for a solution, they are using analogy.
Id.
16. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012). Congress added the Clean Water Act’s oil spill provisions in
the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970), and in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
17. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990).
18. See Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/privacy-fears-assurveillance-grows-in-cities.html.
19. Id.
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service.20 However, the program has come under fire for compiling “data about the
everyday movements and habits of law-abiding residents, raising legal and ethical
questions about tracking people so closely.”21 At least one city has placed a
moratorium on the use of some surveillance devices such as license plate readers.22
As this example shows, Big Data promises many beneficial uses and applications.
It offers crime reduction, improved health and safety, new services and industries,
greater efficiency, and much more. Yet, left unaddressed, its alarming impacts on
individual privacy could provoke a political backlash that will inhibit and limit its
use.23 Some organizations, anticipating such a reaction, have already “clamped
down on their sensitive data, uncertain about what, if anything, they can release
without jeopardizing the privacy of individuals.”24 “If privacy concerns are not
adequately addressed, they may stall or disrupt the deployment of new technologies
that offer many potential economic and quality-of-life benefits to consumers.”25 In
order to unlock the great potential of Big Data, society must find ways to address
and prevent the privacy threats that it poses.26 “Big data is the new oil” is a
powerful analogy that can suggest strategies for achieving this.
II. BIG DATA IS THE NEW OIL (POLLUTION)
Big Data and data analytics will create many important benefits for society.
The positive side of the “Big Data is the new oil” analogy is, in many ways, an
accurate comparison. However, it is vital also to appreciate the negative dimension
of the analogy—the comparison between Big Data’s privacy impacts and oil
pollution. As explained above, it is only by doing so that society will be able to
unlock Big Data’s great potential. The positive and negative dimensions of the
analogy are linked: in order to have the first, one must also explore and address the
second.
The oil-based economy generates two main types of pollution: oil spills that
despoil waters, beaches and coastlines; and carbon emissions that contribute to
climate change.27 Each of these forms of oil-based pollution is analogous to Big
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See CAVOUKIAN & JONAS, supra note 3, at 3 (explaining that “technological advances improve
our ability to exploit Big Data, potential privacy concerns could stir a regulatory backlash that would
dampen the data economy and stifle innovation”); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of
Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63 (2012) (suggesting the same).
24. Erica Klarreich & Simons Science News, Privacy by the Numbers: A New Approach to
Safeguarding Data, SCI. AM. (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/privacy-bythe-numbers-a-new-approach-to-safeguarding-data.
25. DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE NEED FOR AN R&D ROADMAP FOR
PRIVACY 1 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www2.itif.org/2012-privacy-roadmap.pdf.
26. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, UNLOCKING THE VALUE OF PERSONAL DATA: FROM COLLECTION
TO
USAGE
11-13
(Feb.
2013),
available
at
http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/WEF_IT_UnlockingValuePersonalData_CollectionUsage_Report_2013.pdf (explaining that better
privacy governance will allow the continued and expanded use of Big Data).
27. The use of oil and oil-derivatives such as gasoline contribute to other types of pollution such as
the release of volatile organic compounds that produce ground-level ozone (i.e., smog), leaks from
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Data’s privacy impacts.
A. Data Spills are Like Oil Spills
The extraction, transportation and storage of oil and oil-based derivatives (such
as gasoline or home heating oil) inevitably lead to oil spills. The 1989 Exxon
Valdez spills that released 11 million gallons of crude oil into Alaska’s Prince
William Sound,28 and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil gusher in the Gulf of
Mexico,29 are dramatic examples, but hardly the only ones. There have been many,
many other oil spills, both on land and at sea. Oil spills can injure coastlines,
beaches, fish, marine ecosystems, and water quality.30 They can also damage
commercial industries, such as fishing or tourism. In all of these ways, oil spills
cause great damage.31
Data spills do too. Since 2005, there have been more than four thousand
reported data breach incidents,32 an estimate that likely undercounts the true
number.33 Large-scale, recent incidents include the 2013 Target Thanksgiving and
Christmas shopping season security breach that released an estimated 70-110
million records;34 the 2007 TJX Company’s international release of an estimated
100 million records; 35 and the 2011 Sony release of 101 million records, including
over 12 million unencrypted credit card numbers.36
Data brokers37 and other users of Big Data38 contribute substantially to the

underground storage tanks, and other forms of air and land pollution. Oil spills and carbon emissions
are two of the most significant forms of oil-based pollution and will be the focus here.
28. Exxon Valdez Spill Profile, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/learning/exxon.htm
(last updated Jan. 16, 2014).
29. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_
oil_spill (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
30. FRED BOSSELMAN, ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 320, 333 (3d ed. 2010).
31. E. A. Barry-Pheby, The Growth of Environmental Justice and Environmental Protection in
International Law: In the Context of Regulation of the Arctic’s Offshore Oil Industry, 13 SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L. & POL’Y 48 (2013).
32. See Chronology of Data Breaches, supra note 11. In many spills, the number of records
released is unknown. The estimate does not include these incidents. See id. It further excludes spills,
of which there may be many, that do not release Social Security Numbers or financial information. See
id.
33. This estimate includes only those breaches that involved social security numbers or financial
information, and that excludes the many breaches for which the number of records released is not
known. See id.
34. See id. (explaining that Target “customers who used a payment card at any of Target's stores
nationwide between November 27, 2013 and December 15, 2013 may have had their payment card
information copied for fraudulent purposes. Customer names, credit or debit card numbers, card
expiration dates, and card security codes were taken and have appeared on the black market.”)
35. See id. (describing the 2003-2006 security breach at TJX that released data about “credit card,
debit card, check, and merchandise return transactions.”)
36. See id. (describing the cybercriminal attack on the Sony data center in San Diego).
37. See Jessica Rich, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Protection, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Privacy Today and
the FTC’s 2014 Privacy Agency, Address Before the Int’l Ass’n of Privacy Prof’ls (Dec. 6, 2013),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-today-ftcs-
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problem.39 For example, Acxiom, a major data broker, possesses an average of
1,500 data points on 500 million active consumers worldwide, including the
majority of American adults.40 A 2003 Acxiom data breach released an estimated
1.6 billion records containing personal information.41
If data is the new oil, then these data releases are the new oil spills. In fact,
they have come to be known as “data spills.”42 The analogy runs deep. Just like
oil spills, data spills cause different types of damages. These include identity theft,
in which criminals use released personal information to impersonate the individual
and withdraw money, open credit cards, take out loans, or make purchases in that
person’s name;43 the increased risk of identity theft, which causes the victims to
incur prevention costs (e.g., paying for credit monitoring) and to experience worry
2014-privacy-agency/131206privacytodayjrich.pdf (identifying data brokers as a primary example of an
industry that uses Big Data).
38. See generally STAFF REPORT FOR CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER, OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT &
INVESTIGATIONS: MAJORITY STAFF, S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANS., A REVIEW OF THE DATA
BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES
(Dec.
18,
2013),
available
at
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/
?a=Files.Serve&File_id=0d2b3642-6221-4888-a631-08f2f255b577 (explaining that contemporary data
brokers use extremely large amounts of personal data).
39. The FTC defines data brokers as “companies that collect information, including personal
information about consumers, from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of reselling such
information to their customers for various purposes, including verifying an individual’s identity,
differentiating records, marketing products, and preventing financial fraud.” FED. TRADE COMM’N,
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 68 (2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendationsbusinesses-policymakers.
40. See Natasha Singer, You For Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-consumer-databasemarketing.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
41. Acxiom Data Breaches, PSEUDO-FLAW.NET, http://pseudo-flaw.net/content/acxiom-databreaches (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). Two data breaches at ChoicePoint, in 2003 and 2005, released the
personal financial records of 163,000 consumers, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges;
To Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 26,
2006), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2006/01/choicepoint-settles-data-security-breachcharges-pay-10-million, and resulted in at least 800 documented cases of identity theft, see Rich, supra
note 37. LexisNexis, Dun & Bradstreet, Kroll Background America Inc., and the National White Collar
Crime Center, who rank amongst the largest consumer and business data aggregators, recently revealed
that they too experienced a large data spill. Data Broker Giants Hacked by ID Theft Service,
KREBSONSECURITY (Sept. 13, 2013), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/09/data-broker-giants-hacked-byid-theft-service; Data Broker Hackers Also Compromised NW3C, KREBS ON SEC. (Oct. 13, 2013)
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/10/data-broker-hackers-also-compromised-nw3c.
42. See, e.g., Brett Glass, Tower Records Suffers Massive Data Spill, EXTREMETECH (Dec. 12,
2002, 5:51 AM), http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/52810-tower-records-suffers-massive-data-spill.
43. Victims of identity theft must often spend considerable amounts of money and time contesting
the charges or liabilities, restoring their credit, and reclaiming their identity, if they can fully achieve
this at all. Some analysts distinguish between identity fraud and identity theft. TERRI CULLEN, THE
WALL ST. JOURNAL. COMPLETE IDENTITY THEFT GUIDEBOOK: HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF FROM THE
MOST PERVASIVE CRIME IN AMERICA 11-12 (2007). Identity fraud is when a criminal uses stolen
sensitive personal information to steal money from bank accounts, open credit lines using the victim’s
information, or steal from existing credit card accounts. Id at 20. Identity theft is when a criminal uses
the stolen, sensitive, personal information to actually impersonate the victim. Id.
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and stress; and the release of sensitive data (e.g., sexual orientation, HIV status),
which can cause the victims to experience acute embarrassment and/or stigma. Oil
and data spills are also similar in that each tends to impose small harms on a large
number of people. This creates both collective action and free-rider problems for
any tort claimants seeking damages for such injuries. The availability of class
actions notwithstanding, these common features of oil and data spills frequently
frustrate tort remedies and may justify some type of statutory response. Finally, in
both oil and data spills, size matters. Just as large oil spills generally cause more
damage than small ones, so big data spills frequently create more harm than smaller
releases. They affect more people. They also increase the chance that hackers and
criminals will be able to re-identify purported “anonymized” databases since larger
amounts of data increase the probability of correlation with other, identified data,
and so facilitate re-identification.44 For all of these reasons, data spills—
particularly big data spills—are analogous to oil spills.
B. The Glass House Effect
Big Data’s privacy injuries are also analogous to the second principal type of
oil-based pollution: carbon emissions and climate change. The combustion of oil
and other fossil fuels has generated a layer of carbon dioxide in the upper
atmosphere that allows in the sun’s rays but then traps its heat.45 This “greenhouse
effect” contributes to global warming and climate change, disturbs ecosystems and
weather patterns, and so makes the earth less hospitable for human and natural
life.46 In much the same way, the information economy, and Big Data technologies
in particular, are generating a mass of data that is expanding at an exponential rate.
According to one estimate, ninety percent of the world’s data, from the beginning
of human history until the present, has been produced in just the past two years.47
This total is projected to double every two years for the foreseeable future.48 Data
is growing even faster than atmospheric carbon.
Just as the accumulation of greenhouse gases traps the sun’s heat, so the
accumulation of data concentrates the hot glare of public scrutiny. It reveals and
shines a light on personal information about medical conditions, sexual orientation,
political interests, intellectual explorations, and all other manner of sensitive,
personal information. This can make us more likely to conform, and less likely to

44. See CAVOUKIAN & JONAS, supra note 3, at 3 (explaining that “Big Data can increase the risk of
re-identification”).
45. ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 120709 (7th ed. 2013); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007:
SYNTHESIS
REPORT
(2008),
available
at
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC].
46. IPCC, supra note 45, at 26; PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 45, at 1207-09.
47. Big Data, for Better or Worse: 90% of World’s Data Generated Over Last Two Years, SCI.
DAILY (May 22, 2013), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130522085217.htm; MAYERSCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 151 (“The size and scale of data collection will increase by
leaps and bounds as storage costs continue to plummet and analytic tools become ever more powerful.”)
48. Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html.
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experiment, explore, and so to find and become who we want or need to be. In so
doing, Big Data makes the social world less hospitable for the full flowering and
development of the human personality which requires a degree of shade and shelter
in order to flourish.49 As Julie Cohen has so insightfully put it, it creates a “subtle
yet fundamental shift in the content of our character, a blunting and blurring of
rough edges and sharp lines. . . . The condition of no-privacy threatens not only to
chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the
force of our aspiration to it.”50
This is not the greenhouse effect, but the glass house effect. Big Data is
creating a world in which each of us is increasingly living in a glass house where
many of our most personal features—our relationships, anxieties, political beliefs,
interests, sexual desires, location, purchases, criminal and financial history, and
much else—are observable by others. One need only think about the National
Security Agency’s collection and storage of who we call and what we do on the
Web; or the fact that Google accesses and reads our Gmail messages; or that
mobile phone apps invisibly collect our location and contact information, even
when they are not at all relevant to the service that the app provides, to get a sense
of what is happening. Just as the greenhouse effect alters the earth’s climate in
ways that make it less friendly to natural ecosystems, so the glass house effect
changes the social climate in ways that make it far less conducive to personal
development. If this trend continues, we will pass on to our children a depleted
ecosystem for the cultivation of the human personality. It is vital to human
development, creativity and innovation that we prevent this.
It is equally vital to future of Big Data. As mentioned above, Big Data and
data analytics possess a truly great potential to enhance human health, quality of
life, the environment, economic prosperity and much more.51 Yet this activity’s
harmful by-products—the privacy injuries that it creates—are already throwing up
obstacles for the field. If left unaddressed, they may well produce a social and
political backlash against Big Data, one that could significantly reduce the use of
data analytics and prevent it from fully making its valuable contributions. In order
to unlock Big Data’s potential and achieve its great benefits, it is essential
simultaneously to address and mitigate the privacy harms that it creates.52 Those
who care about privacy, and those who wish to advance Big Data and data
analytics, should all be interested in finding solutions to Big Data’s privacy
impacts.

49. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1373, 1424 (2000) (explaining that “autonomy in a contingent world requires a zone of relative
insulation from outside scrutiny and interference—a field of operation within which to engage in the
conscious construction of self.”)
50. Id. at 1426.
51. See CAVOUKIAN & JONAS, supra note 3; See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4;
See MANYIKA ET AL, supra note 6; see Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
52. Brill Lecture, supra note 2 (discussing the operation of Big Data in a way that “respects
consumer privacy and engenders consumer trust, allowing big data to reach its full potential to benefit
us all.”)
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III. OIL POLLUTION LAW AND POLICY AS A MODEL
This takes us back to Gavetti and Rivkin and the power of analogy.53 The
preceding section has argued that Big Data’s privacy injuries (the new problem) are
analogous to oil pollution (the familiar one). The next step would be take the
approaches that society has employed to address oil pollution, translate them into
the realm of Big Data and privacy, and so develop strategies for reducing Big
Data’s privacy impacts.
As described above, the oil and privacy problems are analogous in two distinct
ways: oil spills are analogous to data spills; and the increase in greenhouse gases is
similar to the accumulation of Big Data. When it comes to oil, these two sorts of
pollution are distinct and addressing them requires different strategies. It therefore
makes sense to separate out the two types of privacy harms associated with Big
Data—data spills, and the glass house effect—and explore separately what
environmental regulation can teach us about addressing each of them.
A. The History of Oil Pollution Law Suggests Ways to Reduce Data Spills
At the beginning of the oil era, in the 19th Century, the law supported those
who produced and transported this valuable substance and insulated them, to some
degree, from large-scale, potentially uninsurable liability for the damage that their
activities caused.54
To begin with, tort law required victims of an oil spill to demonstrate that the
spiller had acted negligently—a difficult task in a risky field where even those who
took due care could experience accidents and spills.55 Further, the law limited the
types of damages that were legally cognizable. Maritime tort law recognized
property damage from oil spills, but not injuries to fishing, tourism and other nonproperty-based commercial injuries.56 Finally, as if tort liability were not yet
sufficiently constrained, Congress passed the Limitation on Liability Act of 1851,
which capped oil spill damages at the value of the vessel and freight remaining
after the accident.57 Congress intended this statute to facilitate the transportation of
an otherwise uninsurable, yet economically critical, cargo. Over time, it came to
produce patently absurd results. For example, under the terms of the Act the 1967
wreck of the Torrey Canyon oil tanker, which spilled over 100,000 tons of crude oil
into the English channel and despoiled 100 miles of French and British coasts,
would have resulted in only $50 in damages—the value of the sole remaining

53. See Gavetti & Rivkin, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
54. See generally Mark A. White, The 1851 Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act: Should the
Courts Deliver the Final Blow?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 821 (2004) (explaining how legal doctrines
supported the growth of the nascent American oil transportation industry).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 307 (1927); Louisiana v. M/V
Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985).
57. Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (1984) (current version at 46 U.S.C.
§§ 30501-30512 (2012)).
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lifeboat.58
Congress began to correct the situation in the 1970 and 1972 Amendments to
the Clean Water Act.59 Following the massive Exxon Valdez oil spill, it took even
more vigorous action in the 1990 Oil Pollution Act.60 Together, these statutes rewrite oil pollution law. They allow the government to clean up an oil spill and
bring an action against the responsible party to recoup the clean-up costs,61 thereby
reducing the collective action and free-rider problems that undermine private tort
actions. They recognize new causes of action for damage to economic, as opposed
to simply property-based, interests.62 For example, it allows commercial fishermen
and owners of businesses that rely on beach tourism to sue for the damage that an
oil spill caused to their enterprise.63 Although the statutes do not expressly address
the point, courts have interpreted them as rejecting the negligence-based tort
regime and creating strict liability for defendants with respect to oil removal and
clean-up costs.64 The statutes greatly increased the amount of damages for which
oil spill defendants could be held liable.65 Today, vessels over 3,000 tons can face
liability of up to $22,000,000 per incident.66 Finally, the Oil Pollution Act requires
all new oil transportation vessels operating in U.S. waters to employ a double hull
design that greatly decreases the chance of an oil spill.67 Taken together, these
58. Jeffrey D. Morgan, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Look at its Impact on the Oil Industry, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994).
59. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
60. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990).
61. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, §§ 11(c)(1), (f), 84 Stat. at 93 (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1321 (c)(1), (f) (2012).; see also Kenneth M. Murchison, Liability Under the Oil Pollution
Act: Current Law and Needed Revisions, 71 LA. L. REV. 917, 920 (2011).
62. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-380, § 1002(b)(2)(E), 104 Stat. 484, 490 (1990) (codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (2012)) (allowing claims for “[d]amages equal to the loss of profits or
impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property
or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant.”); see also Murchison, supra note 61.
63. See John C. P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the Deepwater
Horizon Spill, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 335 (2011) (describing newly available claims); Antonio J.
Rodriguez and Paul A.C. Jaffe, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1 (1990) (same); In re
Settoon Towing LLC, 2009 WL 4730969 (E.D. La. 2009) (allowing plaintiffs’ claim for loss of profits
to go forward); Dunham-Price Group, LLC v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 2010 WL 1285446 (W.D. La.
2010) (allowing a pure economic claim for loss of use, increased expense, business interruption and
related damages under the OPA); FGDI LLC v. M/V Lorelay, 193 Fed. App’x. 853 (11th Cir. 2006)
(allowing a grain elevator owner to bring his claim based on the delay that an oil spill caused his
business).
64. Murchison, supra note 61, at 922. See, e.g., In re Oriental Republic of Uru., 821 F. Supp. 928,
931 (D. Del. 1992); Total Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 178, 180 (1987); United States v.
M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
65. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, § 1004(a)(1), 104 Stat. at 491-92 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §
2704(a)(1) (2012)). The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 raised the limits to the greater of $1,200 per ton, or
$10,000,000 for a vessel greater than 3,000 tons, or $2,000,000 for a smaller vessel. Id.
66. Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-241, § 603(a)(1), 120 Stat.
516, 553 (2006) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1) (2012)) (raising the liability amounts).
67. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, § 4115(a), 104 Stat. at 517-18 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §
3703a (2012)).
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strategies have significantly improved the oil spill problem. “The Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 is widely viewed as an enormous success. It is credited with improving the
safety of oil tankers operating in U.S. waters and its double hull requirement has
now been adopted internationally.”68
This environmental law success story holds important lessons for Big Data.
As with the early laws governing the oil industry, today’s doctrines appear to favor
the production, storage and transfer of the “new oil.” Plaintiffs alleging damages
from data security breaches must generally show negligence, although this is
difficult to demonstrate in an area of uncertain and rapidly evolving security
standards and practices.69 Even where plaintiffs can prove their case, courts
generally allow damages only for concrete economic injuries associated with
identity theft.70 They refuse to recognize the other, non-economic damages that
data spills create.71 For example, some data breach plaintiffs, relying on cases that
award damages for fear of illness from exposure to pathogens, have sought
damages for fear of identity theft based on release of personal information;72 courts
have rejected these claims.73 They have similarly denied claims for emotional
distress damages based solely on the disclosure of a plaintiff’s personal
information, allowing these claims to go forward only where the plaintiff alleges
fraudulent use of the information.74 Seen in combination, these doctrines suggest
that—perhaps in an effort to bolster the information economy—the law favors the
collectors and users of personal information over those who suffer damage from
data spills. This is similar to the law governing oil spills prior to the 1970 Clean
Water Act. Highly damaging spills such as the wreck of the Torrey Canyon, or the
Exxon Valdez, spurred Congress to conduct a long-overdue revision of liability

68. PERCIVAL, supra note 45, at 137.
69. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the
Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 263-65, 268 (2007).
70. Timothy H. Madden, Data Breach Class Action Litigation - A Tough Road for Plaintiffs, 55
BOSTON B.J. 27, 29 (2011); see, e.g., In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 133 (D. Me.
2009), rev’d in part, Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F. 3d 151 (1st Cir. 2011) (allowing a claim
for concrete, economic damages).
71. See Anderson, 659 F.3d at 162.
72. Derek A. Bishop, No Harm No Foul: Limits on Damages Awards for Individuals Subject to a
Data Breach, 4 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 1, ¶ 12 (2008).
73. See, e.g., Stollenwerk v. Tri-W. Healthcare Alliance, Civ. 03-0185PHXSRB, 2005 WL
2465906, *2-5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, & remanded sub nom., Stollenwerk v.
Tri-W. Health Care Alliance, 254 F. App'x 664 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that injuries from exposure of
personal information are only compensable if: 1) the exposure of sensitive personal information was
significant, 2) the exposure significantly increased the risk of identity fraud, and 3) credit monitoring
was necessary and effective in preventing identity fraud); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F. 3d 629,
638-40 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that damages of credit monitoring for information exposure “are not
compensable as a matter of Indiana law”); Pinero v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Serv. Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 710,
716 (E.D. La. 2009) (holding the plaintiff could not recover damages for fear and credit monitoring,
among other things, as these damages are “merely speculative”); Carolyn A. Deverich, Brian R. Strange,
& David A. Holop, Into the Breach: Plaintiffs Have Been Increasingly Successful in Gaining Injunctive
Relief for Online Security Breaches, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2012, at 27-28 (discussing case law in this area);
Bishop, supra note 72 (same).
74. Bishop, supra note 72, ¶ 23.

2014]

THE GLASS HOUSE EFFECT

385

limits and tort doctrines.75 High-profile data spills, such as Target’s recent release
of 70-110 million customers’ credit card and other personal information, may
eventually prompt a similar legal transformation with respect to data security
breaches. Why should society wait for the Big Data equivalent of the Exxon
Valdez spill to require companies to internalize the full costs of their data security
breaches? Big Data has arrived. The law need no longer nurture it. Rather, it
should require the users of Big Data to internalize their external costs, thus making
the information economy sustainable in the long term.
Employing the power of analogy, it should be possible to take the successful
environmental law measures described above, adapt them for the data spill purpose,
and so develop strategies to prevent data spills. For example, Congress could take
a page from the Clean Water Act and pass legislation that authorizes government
“clean up” of data spills (e.g., provision of credit monitoring, counseling and
identity theft recovery services).76 The agency that carries out the clean-up could
then seek reimbursement from those responsible for the spill. This would reduce
the collective action and free-rider problems that would otherwise inhibit private
cost recovery lawsuits.
Like the Oil Pollution Act, such legislation could expand tort liability and
require courts to recognize the non-economic damages that data spills create.77 For
example, Congress could expressly allow plaintiffs to seek damages for the
emotional distress caused by the release of important personal information or from
the risk of identity theft. Additionally, such a statute could establish strict liability
for data spills, thus eliminating the need to prove a defendant’s negligence.78
Finally, just as the Oil Pollution Act requires oil transporters to design their ships in
an environmentally protective way,79 so the legislation could require informationintensive firms to utilize privacy by design.80 If oil tankers must use double hulls,

75. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
76. See Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11(c)(1), (f), 84 Stat. 91, 93
(1970) (codified as amended at 33 USC § 1321(c)(1), (f) (2012)).
77. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (2012) (providing that damages for “the loss of profits or
impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property,
or natural resources . . . shall be recoverable by any claimant.”).
78. See David Vladeck, Defining “Privacy” in a Big Data World, in MIT BIG DATA INITIATIVE AT
CSAIL, MEMBER WORKSHOP #2: BIG DATA PRIVACY: EXPLORING THE FUTURE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
PROTECTING
PRIVACY
7,
9
(last
updated
Sept.
2013),
available
at
IN
http://bigdata.csail.mit.edu/sites/bigdata/files/u9/MITBigDataPrivacy_WKSHP_2013_finalvWEB.pdf
(calling for consideration of strict liability legal regime for data analytics privacy harms); Danielle Keats
Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information
Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 265-67 (2007) (arguing for a strict liability standard, as opposed to
negligence, for breaches of data reservoirs).
79. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, § 4115(a), 104 Stat. at 517-18 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
§ 3703a (2012)).
80. See, e.g., ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE 7 FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES (2011),
available at www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2009/08/7foundationalprinciples.pdf (describing
seven key features of privacy by design); ANN CAVOUKIAN & JEFF JONAS, PRIVACY BY DESIGN IN THE
AGE OF BIG DATA 4 (2012), available at http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2012/06/pbdbig_data.pdf (discussing the application of privacy by design principles to Big Data and data analytics).
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perhaps data security systems should have to employ two-factor authentication.81
These are preliminary thoughts intended to illustrate how the oil-Big Data analogy
can generate creative ideas about ways to address Big Data’s privacy impacts.82
Further work will be required to assess whether these ideas can be developed into
full-fledged policy proposals.
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY AS A MODEL
Even if all these measures were adopted, they would only address the first
aspect of the Big Data privacy issue: data spills. They would do nothing to reduce
the glass house effect, the deeper and more profound problem. The glass house
effect is analogous to climate change. So the question becomes: is it possible to
translate climate change law and policy into the realm of privacy, and so generate
ideas on how to protect privacy in the era of Big Data?
A. Climate Change Law and Policy
The human combustion of fossil fuels, a significant contributor to climate
change, lies at the very foundation of all industrial economies. This feature
strongly influences climate change law and policy. It makes it difficult to employ
traditional emission control requirements in order to achieve reductions. The sheer
number and diversity of emissions sources defies the development and enforcement
of such standards for all but the largest-emitting sectors. Moreover, carbon
emissions are so huge and so pervasive that requiring a limited number of emitters
to reduce their emissions by some feasible percentage will not achieve the decrease
needed to prevent climate change and its associated ills.
Achieving this goal requires, not control requirements for fossil fuel-based
energy technologies, but rather the large-scale implementation of alternative energy
technologies.83 Developed and emerging economies need to shift to clean energy

81. Professor Paul Ohm made this connection and generously shared it with me. Telephone
Interview with Paul Ohm, Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School (June 13, 2013).
Two-factor authentication can be defined as
a security process in which the user provides two means of identification, one of which is
typically a physical token, such as a card, and the other of which is typically something
memorized, such as a security code. In this context, the two factors involved are
sometimes spoken of as something you have and something you know. A common
example of two-factor authentication is a bank card: the card itself is the physical item
and the personal identification number (PIN) is the data that goes with it.
Margaret
Rouse,
Two-Factor
Authentication,
TECHTARGET,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/two-factor-authentication (last updated Sept. 2005),
(emphasis in original).
82. See Gavetti & Rivkin, supra note 13, at 6 (explaining that analogies “can spark breakthrough
thinking”).
83. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH.,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ACCELERATING THE PACE OF CHANGE IN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
THROUGH AN INTEGRATED FEDERAL ENERGY POLICY 8-9 (Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-energy-tech-report.pdf [hereinafter
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES] (calling for an energy innovation agenda in
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sources such as solar, hydrogen, geothermal, wind, water, and (if it can be done
more safely) nuclear energy technologies.84 Climate change policy seeks to
facilitate and bring about this technological transformation. Analysts suggest that
such a shift will not only reduce carbon emissions, but that it could also generate
new businesses, industries, and jobs as American engineers and manufactures meet
the need for clean energy technologies at home and abroad.85 Some see this as one
of the nation’s most important opportunities for future economic growth and job
creation.86 The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
concluded that “American economic competitiveness, environmental stewardship,
and enhanced security depend on picking up the pace of energy technology
innovation . . . .”87
B. Policies to Promote the Clean Energy Transformation
Given these economic opportunities, one might assume that the market alone
would meet the need for clean energy technologies. That is not the case. Three
market failures—negative externalities, the public goods problem, and positive
spillovers from basic research—lead the private sector to underinvest in clean
energy technologies.88 Government can correct for these market failures and so
produce something closer to an optimal level of investment.89
A negative externality exists when the producer of a good does not have to
bear the full costs of production and is, instead, able to “externalize” these costs
onto others.90 Environmental damage is an important type of negative externality.91

order to achieve a “low-carbon transformation for purposes of both climate change risk mitigation and
energy security”).
84. See id. at 3-4 (describing an integrated innovation ecosystem that includes invention, translation
to commercial product adoption, and diffusion of new clean energy technologies).
85. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, INNOVATE, MANUFACTURE, COMPETE: A CLEAN ENERGY
ACTION PLAN 10 (2012), available at http://www.pewenvironment.org/uploadedFiles/PEG/
Newsroom/Press_Release/Innovate,%20Manufacture,%20Compete.pdf (stating that “clean energy helps
create employment, manufacturing, and export opportunities while reducing the pollution and risks
associated with current energy patterns and technologies”).
86. See id. at 16 (stating, “research shows that investments in clean energy have yielded more than
three times the number of jobs as have comparable investments in conventional fossil fuels”); AM.
ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, CATALYZING AMERICAN INGENUITY: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN
ENERGY INNOVATION 9 (2011), available at http://americanenergyinnovation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/AEIC_Catalyzing_Ingenuity_2011.pdf (“[T]o break out of our current
economic malaise, America needs to innovate, manufacture and build new technologies. This is true in
many sectors of our economy, and is certainly true in energy.”).
87. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 83, at 1-2.
88. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND
PRODUCTION OF FUELS AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 1, 8-9 (Mar. 2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-06-FuelsandEnergy_Brief.pdf (describing
externality and positive spillover issues); AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 10-11
(describing public good and positive spillover issues).
89. Id. at 10-11 (making the case for an active government role in energy innovation).
90. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 44 (5th ed. 2007) (explaining
that “[t]he reason the market fails in the presence of external costs is that the generator of the externality
does not have to pay for harming others”).
91. Id.
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When a company pollutes, it does not itself experience most of the health and
environmental impacts of that pollution. Rather, it externalizes these costs onto the
surrounding members of the public.92 Since the company does not bear the
majority of these costs it has little reason to invest in technologies that would
reduce or prevent them, even where the benefits from such technologies (in terms
of health and environmental gains) would exceed their cost. Negative externalities
thus lead to sub-optimal investment in pollution reduction technologies.93 The
climate change area follows this general pattern. The operators of coal-fired power
plants and other companies that burn fossil fuels and emit greenhouse gases
contribute to climate change. However, much of the damage that climate change
causes—the rising sea levels, spread of disease, species extinctions and droughts—
does not affect these companies directly. Rather, the companies are able to
externalize these costs onto the public.94 They therefore tend to invest too little in
technologies that would prevent them.95
The public goods problem is related, though distinct. It looks at the
hypothetical company that does decide to invest in and implement clean energy
technology. Assume that such a company decreases its greenhouse gas emissions
and so reduces the harmful effects of climate change. While it has created a good
(a more stable climate) that many might be willing to pay for, it will not be able to
charge for this good because it will not be able to exclude anyone from receiving
the benefits of it.96 Climate stability is a “public good” in the case that, if it is
available to one, then it is available to all.97 Since the company cannot charge for
this good, it has little incentive to invest in producing it, even where the value of
the good would exceed the costs of production.98 Thus the public goods problem,
much like the negative externality one, leads to underinvestment in clean energy
technology.
The third market failure is rooted in the fact that investments in basic research
frequently yield general scientific knowledge that, while highly useful, cannot be
the subject of a patent.99 As a result, those who make such discoveries must share
them with others, including their competitors.100 The benefits, in effect, “spill
over” from the one that created them to others who will also find them useful.
Since the creator cannot exclude others from its discoveries, it cannot charge for
them. This greatly reduces its incentive to engage in basic research, even where the

92. JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 20-22 (3rd
ed. 2010).
93. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 8-9.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 54 (1994)
(defining “public goods” as “commodities that cannot be supplied to a given individual without at the
same time enabling large numbers of other individuals to enjoy them simply because it is impracticable
to exclude those other individuals from such enjoyment.”).
97. Id. at 55.
98. Id.; AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 10.
99. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 9 (stating that “basic research . . . can create
general scientific knowledge that cannot be subject to patents . . .”).
100. AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 10.
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benefits of doing so would exceed the costs.101 The result is underinvestment in the
fundamental research on which many important innovations are grounded.102
Federal clean energy policies seek to correct for these market failures. Some
fund or otherwise seek to stimulate basic research.103 Others seek to address the
externality and public goods problems by requiring, or subsidizing, private sector
investment in renewable energy so as to produce a more optimal level of it.104 For
the most part, the private sector supports government taking this role.105 Federal
clean energy policies include:
• Direct investments in clean energy technologies.106
• Loan programs107 (including both direct loans 108 and loan guarantees)
that support private sector investment in clean energy.109
• Tax preferences for firms that utilize or invest in clean energy,
including special deductions, special tax rates, tax credits, and grants
in lieu of tax credits.110
• Government procurement of renewable energy to meet its own energy
needs.111
101. Id. at 16 (suggesting that“[p]rivate companies are deterred from basic research . . . because they
. . . can’t prevent their competitors from also capturing some of the commercially valuable knowledge
gained through these investments.”).
102. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88 at 1 (“[U]nless the government intervenes, the
amount of research and development (R&D) that the private sector undertakes is likely to be
inefficiently low from society’s perspective because firms cannot easily capture the ‘spillover benefits’
that result from it. That is particularly true at the early stages of developing a technology.”); AM.
ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 10 (explaining that “the privacy sector has tended to
systematically under-invest in R&D relative to the potential gains to society–even where a market for
the desired technology exists” (emphasis in original)).
103. See id. at 16. Such policies assume that private companies will pick up on the results of this
research and use it to develop their own patentable and marketable inventions and products. This
strategy has proven effective in other areas. For example, government scientists mapped out natural
resources, surveyed routes for railroads, conducted basic research on nuclear technologies and, more
recently, created a distributed network of computers (ARPANET) that laid the foundation for the
Internet. Id. at 11-12.
104. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 9. The government can also achieve this by taxing
the emission of greenhouse gases or other pollutants so as to internalize the environmental costs and so
give firms an incentive to reduce this pollution. Id. This strategy, while perhaps the most cost-effective
one as applied to the clean energy area, does not translate as easily into a policy for addressing the glass
house effect. Accordingly, this Article focuses on subsidies in their various forms as a way of
encouraging technological innovation, rather than on fees or taxes.
105. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 85 at 32.
106. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 7. One of the most successful such programs has
been the Department of Energy’s Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy (ARPA-E) initiative
which funds “high-risk, high-payoff research” in clean energy technologies. Id.
107. Id. at 7; EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 7 (June
2013),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/
president27sclimateactionplan.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN] (describing a
Department of Energy loan guarantee program, which supports “investments in innovative
technologies”).
108. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 7.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2.
111. PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 107, at 7-8. The federal government is
nation’s largest consumer of energy. See id. at 7. By insisting that its suppliers meet some of its energy
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•

Comprehensive planning and coordination of government and private
sector clean energy strategies.112 To this end, the President has
initiated a Quadrennial Energy Review to “identify the threats, risks,
and opportunities for U.S. energy and climate security, enabling the
federal government to translate policy goals into a set of analytically
based, clearly articulated, sequenced and integrated actions, and
proposed investments over a four-year planning horizon.”113
• Performance-based clean energy requirements such as fuel efficiency
standards for the auto industry,114 or renewable portfolio standards
(generally passed at the state level), which require utilities to obtain a
certain percentage of their energy from renewable sources.115
While researchers have not yet evaluated all of these initiatives, initial studies
suggest that government programs that fund energy research and development
“often yielded benefits greater than its costs,”116 but that government funding for
“later stages in the [technology] development process has been far less costeffective.”117
C. Promoting Innovation in Clean Data Technology
In much the same way that oil and other fossil fuels lie at the foundation of the
smokestack economy, so Big Data is becoming a foundational building block of the
information economy.118 It is now so pervasive and powerful that traditional
regulatory measures such as notice and choice, or purpose limitations, simply
cannot constrain its privacy impacts. Notice fails because the increasingly
ubiquitous collection and use of personal information renders individual notice
virtually impossible, and because data analysts often cannot predict (and so cannot
provide notice of) how they will use data sets.119 Without notice, choice fails as
needs through renewable energy sources, the government can help to create a market for early
renewable technologies. This can be especially helpful at the early stages of deployment while
producers are working to bring down the cost of these technologies.
112. Id.
113. This is needed to pull together the “amalgam” of energy-related policies and meld them into an
integrated approach that can utilize resources more efficiently and effectively. See PRESIDENT’S
CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 107, at 8.
114. Id.
115. See generally Ivan Gold & Nidhi Thakar, A Survey of State Renewable Portfolio Standards:
Square Pegs for Round Climate Change Holes? 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 183 (2010)
(surveying state renewable portfolio standard programs).
116. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 9 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY
RESEARCH AT DOE: WAS IT WORTH IT? ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND FOSSIL ENERGY RESEARCH 1978 TO
2000 (Nat’l Acad. Press 2001)).
117. Id. at 2. See also REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 83, at 3-4
(dividing the innovation process into four phases—invention, translation, adoption and diffusion—and
arguing that federal support is more effective when targeted at the first of these stages).
118. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 16 (explaining that Big Data “is
becoming a significant corporate asset, a vital economic input, and the foundation of new business
models. It is the oil of the information economy.”).
119. Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY
L. 74, 78 (2013); WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 26, at 11.
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well. Individuals cannot give meaningful consent to uses of which they have had
inadequate notice.120 Purpose limitations create a direct conflict with Big Data, the
value of which lies in continuously re-purposing massive data sets and finding new
and unanticipated uses for them.121 For all of these reasons, traditional privacy
regulation—notice, choice, purpose limitation—will prove ineffective as applied to
Big Data. As in the climate change area, the solution lies more in technological
transformation than in traditional regulatory responses.
Mitigation of the glass house effect will require the development and use of
new “clean data” technologies122 that allow society to derive the benefits of Big
Data, while minimizing its privacy impacts. Such technologies are already
beginning to emerge.123 Privacy-technology experts, Oliveira and Zaïne, have
defined a set of criteria for “privacy-preserving data mining technologies”
(PPDM)—data mining technologies that “encompass[] the dual goal of meeting
privacy requirements and providing valid data mining results.”124 A number of
emerging technologies seek to achieve this goal. For example, differential privacy
techniques allow analysts to query Big Data but introduce a degree of “noise” into
the response.125 This “noise” creates an interference that is large enough to
disguise the presence or absence of any individual in the data set, yet small enough
to ensure that the answer provided is still useful.126 On another front, efforts are
being made to develop “new techniques to securely de-identify data.”127 Privacy-

120. Rubinstein, supra note 119, at 75; Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 7, at 260-61.
121. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 2, 103; WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra
note 26, at 11.
122. See CAVOUKIAN & JONAS, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that attention should “shift from
compliance with FIPs to proactively embedding privacy into the design of new technologies”).
123. See, e.g., Klarreich & Simons Science News, supra note 24 (discussing technologies that allow
us to “get at these data without revealing private information”). See also CYNTHIA DWORK, MICROSOFT
RESEARCH, DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY 8-11 (2006), available at http://pdf.aminer.org/
000/267/828/differential_privacy.pdf (describing differential privacy techniques that allow users to ask
questions of large data sets while preserving individual privacy); Stanley R. M. Oliveira, PrivacyPreserving Data Mining, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DATA WAREHOUSING AND MINING (2d ed. 2008)
(describing emerging data mining technologies that protect privacy and defining the groundwork for
further research and development in this area).
124. OLIVEIRA & ZAÏANE, supra note 9, at 3.
125. See Klarreich & Simons Science News, supra note 24 (describing how a differential algorithm
might “add noise” to an answer by adding or subtracting some number before returning the answer). See
also DWORK, supra note 123 at 9-11 (giving examples of how noise may be added in certain formulas).
126. See DWORK, supra note 123, at 8-9. See also MICROSOFT CORP., DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY FOR
EVERYONE 3-5 (2012), available at http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=35409
(showing an example of how differential privacy can yield useful and privacy-preserving answers). “A
differentially private data release algorithm allows researchers to ask practically any question about a
database of sensitive information and provides answers that have been ‘blurred’ so that they reveal
virtually nothing about any individual’s data–not even whether the individual was in the database in the
first place.” Klarreich & Simons Science News, supra note 24. To achieve this blurring effect,
differential privacy establishes a piece of intermediary software that stands between the one asking the
questions and the database itself. MICROSOFT CORP., supra at 3. This “privacy guard” calculates the
minimum amount of noise needed to protect individual identities, and adds it to the answer that it
provides to the analyst. Id.
127. CASTRO, supra note 25, at 2.
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preserving data mining and successful de-identification (assuming that the latter is
possible)128 offer a glimpse of a more optimistic future. However, most of these
technologies remain at the experimental stage and have not yet been developed as
commercial applications.129
The further development of privacy-preserving data mining technologies will
likely confront the same market failures that the generation of clean energy
technologies has encountered. In the clean data context, as in the clean energy one,
investments in basic research will produce positive spillover effects that private
investors cannot capture and monetize.130 As a result, the private sector will
provide a sub-optimal level of investment in the development of such technologies.
Moreover, a company’s privacy impacts constitute a negative externality, while its
investments in privacy protection create a public good—consumer trust in the
information economy as a whole. These market failures, too, will produce suboptimal investment in privacy-preserving data mining technologies. The rationale
for government support for clean energy technologies thus applies with equal force
to the development of these “clean data” technologies. The United States should
develop a privacy-preserving data mining technology agenda131 that parallels the
nation’s strategy for promoting clean energy.132
Drawing from the clean energy playbook, such an agenda could include:
• Direct investments to support the development of technologies and
techniques, such as differential privacy, that allow analysts to utilize
Big Data but reduce the privacy impacts that result from such
activities. These investments should focus on support of basic
research into such technologies. It should further seek to support the
progress of differential privacy and other existing techniques in order
to move them past the experimental stage and bring them to the point
of commercialization.
• Loan programs (including direct loans and loan guarantees) that
support private sector investment in privacy protective data mining
technologies.
• Tax preferences for data analytics or other firms that utilize or invest
128. See generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) (arguing that efforts to de-identify have failed and
regulators must respond).
129. See MICROSOFT CORP., supra note 126, at 6 (explaining that differential privacy, while
promising, “is [sic] still a research-level technology, not a commercial product, and . . . its potential
implementation in real-life research and commercial scenarios . . . will present mathematical,
computational, and policy challenges that will need to be addressed before it can go into production.”);
MARTIN MEINTS & JAN MÖLLER, PRIVACY PRESERVING DATA MINING: A PROCESS CENTRIC VIEW
FROM A EUROPEAN PROSPECTIVE 12 (2007) (stating that “PPDM is still an area of research and not
readily implemented on the market yet.”)
130. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (explaining that basic research creates positive
spillovers).
131. See CASTRO, supra note 25, at 2 (stating that “the U.S. government should create and fund a
research and development (R&D) roadmap for privacy.”).
132. See generally REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 83 (setting
out a strategy for promoting clean energy).
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in such technologies. These could include special deductions, tax
rates, tax credits, and grants in lieu of tax credits.
• A preference for firms that employ privacy-preserving data mining
technologies in the federal government’s own purchase of data
analytics services. The federal government is a large consumer of
these services. If it gave a preference to such firms this could jumpstart the market for privacy-enhancing data mining technologies and
so promote the development and commercialization of such products.
• Planning and coordination of government and private sector strategies
for the development of privacy-preserving data mining technologies.
The federal government could play a coordinating role in which it
sees the big picture, identifies funding gaps or particularly promising
areas of development, and seeks to direct resources towards these
priority areas. As with the Federal Quadrennial Energy Review,133
this should be a comprehensive planning process that involves
relevant agencies and stakeholders and seeks to integrate existing
efforts in order to marshal resources in the most effective way
possible
Such policies, and the further development of PPDM technologies, are
essential for the preservation of privacy in a Big Data world. They will prove
useful to government agencies and private businesses that apply data mining to
personal information.134 On a broader level, they make sense for any society that
wishes to make greater use of Big Data and enjoy the many benefits it can provide.
As mentioned above, a lack of investment in such technologies, and a consequent
failure to address Big Data’s privacy impacts, could cause a social and political
backlash that could impede further growth in this area.135 Privacy protections are
essential to “unlocking the value of personal data.”136 The development of PPDM
technologies may also provide an important economic opportunity. Many
countries and businesses will need such technologies if they are to exploit fully the
benefits of Big Data and data analytics. Those who develop and patent these new
technologies will possess a competitive advantage in a global market for such
goods and services.
Additional development of privacy tools could also have a positive economic
impact. Investments in developing technological solutions to privacy problems
would help create a network of developers with expertise in this domain.
Developers of such tools would likely be even more competitive in countries with
strict privacy regulations, where there may be a stronger market for privacy-

133. PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 107, at 7-8.
134. See CASTRO, supra note 25, at 2 (stating that “every government agency that uses personally
identifiable information (PII) might benefit, either directly or indirectly, from advances in privacypreserving data mining or new techniques to securely de-identify data. Similarly, industries such as
health care and financial services would benefit from this research as well.”).
135. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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enhanced products and services.137

Politicians and policymakers in the U.S. have made the case that government
investment in clean energy technologies could pay off in increased business
activity, exports and jobs.138 Investments in clean data technologies could too,
though probably on a smaller scale.
The federal government does not yet appear to have fully recognized the
important role that privacy-preserving data mining technologies can play. While it
has put been working to develop laws that will protect privacy better, and has been
enforcing existing rules, it has put “relatively little effort . . . into considering how
new technology might address many of the same privacy challenges.”139 It should
now turn its attention to this policy challenge, just as it has done in the area of clean
energy.
V. CONCLUSION
“Big Data is the new oil” is a powerful analogy, indeed. In six short words it
helps us to envision Big Data’s great potential future. It also helps us to grasp—
intuitively, and immediately—the threats that it poses.140 Data spills are like oil
spills; they damage individual lives and livelihoods just like oil spills do. The
contemporary threat to individual privacy—what this Article has called the “glass
house effect”—is like climate change. We hear about the ways that corporations
and the NSA are collecting, aggregating, and mining our data. The ads we receive
on our computers or mobile devices give us inklings as to what is happening out
there in the data universe and how it is affecting us. Yet the shift is so profound
and pervasive that it almost escapes comprehension. We know what is happening,
and yet we do not know it. We need a framework, a concept, an analogy to help us
grasp something that cannot be understood in its entirety.
Climate change is that analogy. The change is in the very air around us; it is in
the social climate in which we live. A world that once offered some protection for
our private comings and goings, our intellectual or political interests, our
eccentricities, maladies and vulnerabilities, increasingly records them and makes
them visible. The great paradox is that, just as digitization and the Internet open
wide doors for individual exploration, expression and growth, so they increasingly
turn us into a surveillance society in which we feel observed and pressured to
conform. It is like industrial society, which provides us with new goods and tools
that enhance our lives and at the same time threatens to despoil the natural
environment on which we depend.
The “Big Data is the new oil” analogy is valuable because it can help us to see
both the tremendous promise of, and the threats from, Big Data. It can enable us to
grasp, in an instant, something big and mysterious, wonderful and dark, that is
137. CASTRO, supra note 25, at 2.
138. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 85, at 10; AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra
note 86, at 9; REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 83, at 1-2.
139. Id. at 1.
140. Cf. Gavetti & Rivkin, supra note 13, at 2 (explaining that “[a]nalogical reasoning makes
enormously efficient use of the information and mental processing power that strategy makers have.”).
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happening in the world around us. It can also help us to generate solutions.141
Environmental law has developed measures to reduce oil spills and to prevent
climate change. These steps are incomplete and imperfect, particularly where
climate change is concerned. Yet they reflect a body of effort and thinking that,
over time, has crystalized into specific policies, legal doctrines, and government
investments. We need not start from scratch in thinking about how to protect
privacy in the era of Big Data. We can take advantage of the work that has already
been done in the environmental field, translate it to the privacy issue, and emerge
with a starting point for the new task. That is the power of analogy; we should use
that power.

141. Cf. id. at 3 (describing how analogical thinking can “spark creativity”).

